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Abstract: The aim of the paper is to provide several quantitative measures concerning preference structure in a 
group decision making setting. These measures enable to assess group and individual discord, core preferences 
and outliers, or to find a consensus, where a consensus is defined as a preference with a minimum sum of 
distances to other preferences. Also, it is shown that a distance of a consensus to a median preference is upper 
bounded, which might reduce a search for a consensus significantly. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The aim of collective decision making is to undertake the best (optimal) solution to a given 
problem by a group of experts in a given field. Group decision making is present everywhere 
where a committee, a board, a council, etc., has to carry out a decision. It occurs in many 
areas of human action such as economics, politics, environmental protection, education, civil 
engineering, medicine, military, etc., but it is also present in everyday family lives. For a brief 
review of past, present and future of group decision making see e.g. Kameda et al. (2002). 
Decision makers can express their preferences in many different ways. Given a set of 
feasible options (objects, alternatives, candidates, etc.), the most common preference formats 
include rankings of all compared options from the best to the worst, a selection of the best 
option only, or assigning each option its ‘value’ (expressed in points or marks, language 
variables such as ‘very good’, etc.). 
Ranking of options or selection of the best option (without ranking the rest) is a well-
known setting from the social choice theory, where individual decision makers (DMs) are 
called voters, they choose among a finite set of candidates, and their preferences (rankings of 
candidates, usually without ties) are called votes, individual preference list or ballots. For an 
introduction to the social choice theory, see e.g. (Sen 1970; Fishburn 1973; Feldman and 
Serrano 2006; Wulf 2006; Taylor and Pacelli 2009; or Myerson 2013). A winner of an 
election is found with the use of many different social choice functions or procedures such as 
plurality voting, Condorcet’s majority rule, Borda’s method of marks, Copeland method, Hare 
system, see e.g. Taylor and Pacelli (2009). All these methods satisfy some ‘reasonable’ 
properties, such as unrestricted domain, monotonicity, independence of irrelevant alternatives, 
Pareto efficiency, non-dictatorship, etc., see e.g. (Arrow 1951; Fishburn 1973; Wulf 2006 or 
Taylor and Pacelli 2009). But, as shown by Arrow (1951), none method satisfies all of them if 
there at least two decision makers and at least three alternatives (see also Gibbard–
Satterthwaite theorem). Also, some social choice procedures are susceptible to voting 
paradoxes, such as Condorcet’s paradox; see e.g. (Saari 2000; Felsenthal 2010). 
While the literature on social choice theory focuses mainly on examination and comparison 
of social choice functions (procedures) under different conditions, the orientation of this paper 
is slightly different. It focuses on an evaluation of a structure of decision makers’ preferences, 
and a relationship between this structure and a group consensus, because it is the structure of 
preferences that determines whether achieving a group consensus is possible (and whether 
this consensus is unique).  
In this paper a consensus is defined as a preference which minimizes the sum of distances 
to all preferences provided by DMs. In this sense a consensus is an analogue to the geometric 
median, which is defined as a point in an n dimensional Euclidean space En, minimizing a 
sum of distances to a given (finite) set of points from En. However, in this study this concept 
is extended to all spaces endowed with a metric function, called decision spaces, such as a 
space of all permutations Sn of the order n, a space of pairwise comparison matrices, etc.  
As mentioned before, DMs’ preferences determine the result – the consensus. The aim of 
this paper is to provide several new measures and concepts enabling to evaluate a structure of 
decision makers’ preferences, and to show how to use it in finding a consensus especially if 
the decision space is discrete (for example Sn). 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 basic concepts and notation is introduced. 
In section 3 some theoretical properties are examined and section 4 provides numerical 
examples. Section 5 provides a brief discussion of well-defined and ill-defined problems and 
in section 6 some possible extensions to the proposed approach are discussed. Conclusions 
close the article. 
 
2 Concepts and notation 
 
In this paper it is assumed that a finite set of decision makers evaluate a finite set of 
alternatives and provide their (crisp and complete) preferences in such a form that these 
preferences can be considered elements of some metric (decision) space.  
The format of preferences includes:  
• rankings of n alternatives, so they can be regarded elements from a space Sn of all 
permutations of the order n,  
• pairwise comparison matrices as proposed in the analytic hierarchy/network process, 
see Saaty (2001), which are elements from a space of square matrices of the order n,  
• real (integer) number values assigned to each alternative, etc.  
 
Assumption that a decision space is endowed with a suitable metric function is important, 
because it allows measuring distances among preferences.  
 
DEFINITION 1: Let µ  be a function on a set X so that µ  : X × X → R. Function µ  is called 
a metric, if it satisfies the following axioms (1) to (4):   
1. ( ), 0x yµ ≥ , (non-negativity), 
2. ( ), 0x yµ =  if and only if  x y= , (identity),  
3. ( ) ( ), ,x y y xµ µ= , (symmetry),  
4. ( ) ( ) ( ), , ,x z x y y zµ µ µ≤ + , (triangular inequality), for all x, z, y ∈  X.  
Some well-known examples of metric function include: 
i) The distance between two real numbers x and y on a real axis: ( ),x y x yµ = − . 
ii) Euclidean metric, ( ) ( )1 1,..., , ,...,n nnx x x y y y R= = ∈ : ( ) ( ) ( )2 21 1, ... n nx y x y x yµ = − + + −  
iii) Manhattan metric, ( ) ( )1 1,..., , ,...,n nnx x x y y y R= = ∈ : ( ) 1 1, ... n nx y x y x yµ = − + + −  
iv) Kendall’s tau metric defined as a number of transpositions of adjacent pairs of digits 
necessary to turn one permutation into other (also known as the bubble-sort distance). 
v) The distance between matrices A(aij) and B(bij): ( )
1/
,
,
pp
ij ij
i j
A B a bµ
 
= −  
 
∑ , etc. 
In this study all metric functions are equivalent, in numerical section 4 metrics i) and iv) 
are applied. 
Merriam-Webster’s dictionary defines a ‘consensus’ as a general agreement, a unanimity 
of opinions, but in this paper a consensus is defined as a preference closest to a set of given 
preferences, see Definition 2 below. Hence, it is a preference that best describes an opinion of 
a group (also, it can be regarded a compromise).  
 
DEFINITION 2: Let DS be a decision space, that is a space of all feasible decisions D. Let µ  
be a metric function on DS. Suppose a set of n decision makers (DMs) provide n (not 
necessarily distinct) decisions iD DS∈ , { }1, 2,...,i n∈ , which form a subspace of DS denoted 
as DNS. Then: 
i) A decision jD DS∈ for which ( )
1
,
n
j i
i
D Dµ
=
∑  is minimal is called a consensus and 
is denoted as CD  thereinafter. 
ii) A decision jD DNS∈ for which ( )
1
,
n
j i
i
D Dµ
=
∑  is minimal is called a pivot and is 
denoted as PD  thereinafter. 
iii) An average distance of all iD DNS∈  to a consensus (a pivot) is denoted as AVCD 
(AVPD):  
( )
1
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n
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n
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=
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=
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). 
iv) A maximal distance between two iD DS∈  is denoted as MAXD. 
v) A group discord GDIS among iD DNS∈ is given as: 
AVCDGDIS
MAXD
= . 
vi) An individual (relative) discord IDIS (RIDIS) of an element iD DNS∈  is given as:  
( )
1
,
n
i i j
j
IDIS D Dµ
=
= ∑  ( ( ) ( )
1 1 1
, / ,
n n n
i i j i j
j i j
RIDIS D D D Dµ µ
= = =
= ∑ ∑∑ ). 
vii) A jD DNS∈  is called a DNS outlier iff ( ) ( ), 1i CD D AVDµ ε> + , 0ε ≥ . 
viii) A jD DNS∈  belongs into a DNS core iff ( ),i CD D AVDµ ≤ . 
ix) A problem is called well-defined iff there is a unique consensus. Otherwise it is 
called an ill-defined problem. 
x) A cumulative distance function CDF (for well-defined problems) is given as: 
( ) ; ( , ) , 0i i CCDF x D A D D x x MAXDµ= ∈ ≤ ≤ ≤  
 
REMARK 1. In Definition 2i) a consensus might not be unique, in Definition 2ii) a pivot 
might not be unique. An individual discord IDIS from Definition 2vi) expresses the total 
distance of a given preference to all other preferences (RIDIS expresses a ratio of a discord of 
each individual to a group discord, respectively), thus each decision maker is assigned a 
degree of his/her disagreement within a group. By Definition 2vii) decision makers-outliers 
can be identified, and the parameter ε controls the outlier threshold distance. Outlier DMs 
might be excluded from a decision making process. In Definition 2ix) well-defined and ill-
defined problems are introduced, as usually only one consensus is required. In Definition 2x) 
the (piece-wise constant) cumulative distance function enables to recognize a structure of 
decision makers. 
 
 
3 Some relationships regarding a consensus 
 
Intuitively, a consensus should lie somewhere ‘in the middle’ of decision makers’ 
preferences, and it should be not too distant from a pivot preference, which is a ‘midpoint’ of 
all provided preferences. In this section some propositions regarding a consensus are 
provided.  
The following proposition postulates a maximal distance between a consensus and a pivot. 
 
PROPOSITION 1. Let DNS DS⊆ be a space of n decisions Di. Let PD DNS∈  be a pivot and 
let CD DS∈  be a consensus. Then: ( ), 2C PD D AVPDµ ≤ . 
Proof: From triangular inequality we have ( ) ( ) ( ), , ,C P C i i PD D D D D Dµ µ µ≤ + for all i, 
hence summing by all i we obtain: ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
, , ,
n n
C P C i i P
i i
n D D D D D Dµ µ µ
= =
⋅ ≤ +∑ ∑ . Dividing 
by n we get ( )
( ) ( )
1 1
, ,
, 2
n n
C i i P
i i
C P
D D D D
D D AVCD AVPD AVPD
n n
µ µ
µ = =≤ + = + ≤
∑ ∑
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The following proposition restricts a maximum value of AVCD, when a decision space is a 
one dimensional (real) space. 
 
PROPOSITION 2. Let [ ],DNS a b R= ⊂  be the decision space of n decisions Di. Then: 
2
MAXDAVCD ≤ . 
Proof:  
Let’s consider case of n = 2 and let 1 2,D a D b= = .  The distance of these two decisions is 
maximal possible and clearly 
2
MAXDAVCD =  for every consensus (each number from 
[ ],DNS a b=  is a consensus). By adding another preference D3 (and then D4, D5, ...) AVCD 
always decreases, so 
2
MAXDAVCD <  holds. 
 
Next proposition concerns a uniqueness of a consensus in the case when a decision space is 
a one dimensional (real) space. 
 
PROPOSITION 3. Let [ ],DNS a b R= ⊂  be the decision space of n decisions Di. Let 
1 2 ... na D D D b≤ < < < ≤  (all decisions are distinct), and let ( , )i j i jD D D Dµ = − . Then:  
a) For n odd there is a unique consensus 1
2
C nD D +=  . 
b) For n even a consensus is not unique and lies in an interval: 
1
2 2
,C n nD D D
+
 
∈  
 
 
 
Proof (by a contradiction): 
a) Let’s assume that 1
2
' c nD D Dε += + = is a consensus instead of  cD , where ε  is a small 
( 1 3
2 2
n nD Dε + +< − ) positive number which expresses a shift from cD . Let ( )
1
,
n
C i
i
R D Dµ
=
= ∑  
and let ( )
1
',
n
i
i
S D Dµ
=
= ∑ . By substituting 1
2
' c nD D Dε += + = into S we obtain: 
( )
1
1 1
',
2 2
n
i
i
n nS D D R R Rµ ε ε ε
=
+ −
= = + − = + >∑ , so 'D cannot be a consensus.  
Geometrically explained, when we shift a consensus from cD  to 'D  (to the right), the 
distances to all iD  on the left side from 'D  grow by ε , while distances to all iD  on the right 
side from 'D  decrease by ε . But after the shift there is always at least one more iD  on the 
left, so the overall distance (to all iD ) always grows. The proof for larger (or negative) ε  is 
analogical. 
 
b) The proof is analogical to a).  
 
If the decision space is one dimensional, the geometric median is equal to the median, the 
result shown already in Haldane (1948), though the median is not defined unequivocally for 
even number of points. However, from Proposition 3 it follows that for n even every point 
(not only the median) between two ‘middle’ given points is a consensus. 
The importance of Proposition 1 can be seen when considering decisions in the form of 
rankings of k objects (objects ordered from the 1st to the kth place). In such a framework 
rankings are usually treated as permutations from a space Sk of all permutation of order k, and 
consensus is a permutation minimizing the sum of distances to other (given) permutations. 
For a solution (finding a consensus) several permutation methods were proposed, such as 
CRM or DCM, see e.g. (Cook and Kress 1985; Cook 2006; Tavana et al. 2007; Mazurek 
2011).  
Main disadvantage of these methods is that they search through the whole space of Sk, but 
the number of permutations grows as k! and the maximum distance as 
2
k 
 
 
 , so for larger k 
(approx. k > 10) these methods are inapplicable. However, from Proposition 1 it is clear that a 
consensus cannot be too distant from a pivot, hence the searching (discrete) space can be 
reduced significantly (by several orders of magnitude).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Numerical examples 
 
In this section several numerical examples are provided to illustrate concepts and measures 
introduced in section 2.  
 
EXAMPLE 1. A ‘classic’ example from the social choice theory: three candidates (a, b, and 
c) are ranked by three voters in the following way. Find a consensus (a winner):  
 
 
place voter 1 voter 2 voter 3 
1. a b c 
2. b c a 
3. c a b 
 
 
Solution: 
All candidates are ranked equally; there is no consensus; and no winner as well. We can 
evaluate (Kendall’s tau) distances between all preferences (columns C1 to C3): 
( ) ( ) ( ) 23,23,12,1 === CCCCCC µµµ . All preferences have the total distance to others equal to 
4. Each preference is a pivot and also a consensus. Apparently, the problem is ill-defined. 
  
 
EXAMPLE 2. Six decision makers (DM1 to DM6) rank 7 candidates (from A to G) for a given 
managerial position. All rankings are provided in Table 1. Find:  
 
a) a pivot, 
b) a consensus,  
c) a group discord GDIS, AVCD and AVPD, 
d) an individual discord of all DMs, 
e) outliers, 
f) a cumulative distance function. 
 
Solution: 
At the beginning we have to decide what metric is going to be used, as different metrics might 
lead to (slightly) different results. In this example Kendall’s tau distance is applied as a 
natural metric when dealing with rankings (permutations). Also, we set n = 6 and k = 7. 
 
 
Table 1. Rankings of all alternatives by all decision makers. 
 
 Position DM1 DM2 DM3 DM4 DM5 DM6 
1 A C C D A C 
2 C A D A C D 
3 D F A C F A 
4 F D F B B F 
5 B B B G D G 
6 G E G F E E 
7 E G E E G B 
 
a) Pivots are DM1 and DM3 with the sum of distances from the other Di  equal to 16. 
b) The unique consensus DC = (C,A,D,F,B,G,E). Its sum of distances to other Di is 15, 
which is a minimum. 
c) 5
2
AVCD =  , 8
3
AVPD = , ( 1) 21
2
k kMAXD −= = , 5
42
AVCDGDIS
MAXD
= = . 
d) 1 16IDIS = , 2 20IDIS = , 3 16IDIS = , 4 26IDIS = ,  5 24IDIS = , 6 22IDIS = , 
1
16 0.129
124
RIDIS = = , 2 0.161RIDIS = ,  3 0.129RIDIS = , , 4 0.210RIDIS = , 
5 0.194RIDIS = , 6 0.177RIDIS = . ( 4 0.210RIDIS = , for example, means that DM4 is 
responsible for 21% of the disagreement of the group) 
e) For 0ε =  DM4 and DM5 are outliers. These two DMs could be asked to revise their 
preferences or they could be excluded form a decision making process. The rest of 
DMs belongs to the core. 
f) Some values of CDF: CDF(0) = 0,  CDF(1) = 2, CDF(2) = 4, CDF(3) = 4, CDF(4) = 5, 
CDF(5) = 6. 
 
From Proposition 1 we know that ( ), 2C PD D AVPDµ ≤ , and indeed, in this case we 
obtain:  ( ) 16, 1 2
3C P
D D AVPDµ = ≤ = .  
Therefore, the search for the consensus can start with each of two pivots. Then all 
permutations with the distance from the pivot equal to 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 (integers smaller than 
16/3) are examined, and the consensus is found. It is not necessary to examine all possible 
permutations from S7 space (5040 permutations), as it suffices to scrutinize only 343 
permutations for each pivot. (The distribution of permutation distances can be found e. g. in 
Margolius (2001))  
 
 
Table 2. Distances among all alternatives from Example 2. 
 
 DM1 DM2 DM3 DM4 DM5 DM6 
DM1 0 3 2 4 3 4 
DM2 3 0 3 7 2 5 
DM3 2 3 0 4 5 2 
DM4 4 7 4 0 7 4 
DM5 3 2 5 7 0 7 
DM6 4 5 2 4 7 0 
 
 
 
EXAMPLE 3. Six decision makers (DM1 to DM6) rank 7 candidates (from A to G) according 
to their leadership skills. All rankings are provided in Table 3. Find:  
 
a) a pivot, 
b) a consensus,  
c) a group discord GDIS, AVCD and AVPD, 
d) an individual discord of all DMs, 
e) outliers, 
f) a cumulative distance function. 
 Solution:  
The problem is apparently ill-structured, as there are two groups of DMs with identical 
rankings, which are in an ‘opposition’. One cannot expect to get a reasonable result – a 
consensus – under such circumstances. Nevertheless, we set n = 6 and k = 7 and proceed. The 
problem emerges immediately: 
a) All DMi are pivots. 
b) A consensus is not unique. Actually, each permutation ‘between’ (A,B,C,D,E,F,G) 
and (D,A,C,B,G,F,E), for example (D,A,B,C,E,F,G), including the both 
aforementioned permutations, is a consensus with a total distance of 21 to all other 
permutations. 
c) 7
2
AVCD =  , 7
2
AVPD = , ( 1) 21
2
k kMAXD −= = , 1
6
AVCDGDIS
MAXD
= = . 
d) 21iIDIS = ,
21 0.167
126i
RIDIS = =  for all i. 
e) Outliers or a core cannot be identified (there is no unique consensus). 
f) The cumulative distance function requires a unique consensus. Setting (for example) 
DC = DM1 we obtain: ( )0,7) 3CDF  = , ( ) 67 =CDF . A sudden ‘jump’ in CDF values 
indicates a problem in DMs’ preference structure. 
 
But if one decision maker, for example DM1, changes his preferences, then a (unique) 
consensus would be possible, and it will be equal to DM1. Applying the procedure for ill-
defined problems introduced in the next section would result in a removal of all DMs in one 
step, with no consensus (solution) found. 
 
 
Table 3. Rankings of all alternatives by all decision makers. 
 
 Position DM1 DM2 DM3 DM4 DM5 DM6 
1 A A A D D D 
2 B B B A A A 
3 C C C C C C 
4 D D D B B B 
5 E E E G G G 
6 F F F F F F 
7 G G G E E E 
 
 
EXAMPLE 4. Five members of a director board discuss the optimal amount of an investment. 
Their proposals (preferences) are as follows (in thousands of dollars): DM1 = 200, DM2 = 
250, DM3 = 230, DM4 = 310 and DM5 = 190. Find a consensus. 
  
Solution:  
By application of Proposition 3 we immediately get DC = DM3 = 230. The overall distance of 
DC to all DMi is 170. By a change, for example, to D’ = 240 ( 10ε = ), we obtain overall 
distance to all Di = 180, which is more (by 10ε = ) than in the case of  DC = 230.  
The arithmetic mean of all preference numbers is 236, but it is not the closest value to all 
preferences, while the median 230 is the correct result. 
 5 Well-defined and ill-defined problems 
 
Problems of achieving a consensus in a group decision making may be classified as well-
defined (with one unique consensus) or ill-defined (problems leading to no consensus or more 
than one consensus). 
Analysis of preferences is able to indicate the ill-defined problems, as shown in numerical 
examples of the previous section. However, there is not known general method for 
discriminating both cases based only on an analysis of preferences, though it is known that if 
preferences are points in Euclidean space and no three points lie on the same line (there is no 
collinearity), then the consensus is unique, see Vardi and Zhang (2000). 
Question arises how to handle ill-defined problems. In real-world situations, decision 
makers may discuss (negotiate) the problem and change their preferences in a way that 
enables achieving a consensus (see for example Delphi method). This might be case of 
various boards or councils, but it is not possible for example in elections, where once polling 
is over, nothing can be changed. In the social choice theory ill-defined problems are 
considered paradoxes; Example 1 in section 5 for example illustrates the so called circular 
ambiguity, which stems from intransitivity of preferences. During time various sophisticated 
methods were developed to avoid the problem, see e.g. Nurmi (1999).  
In the context of this study a simple way to obtain a well-defined problem from an ill-
defined one lies in the identification of preferences (aka decision makers) with the highest 
discord (outliers). Such preferences might be a subject of revision or can be excluded from a 
decision making process. Then, a new analysis could be performed and a unique consensus 
might be found. If not, a preference with the second highest discord can be changed 
(excluded), and the whole process is repeated until a unique consensus is found or there is no 
preference left (and no solution as well).  
This procedure might succeed in some cases, though unsolvable (ill-defined) instances 
such as from Example 3 (two equally strong opposing groups) will persist (the proposed 
procedure excludes all preferences at the beginning as all preferences have the same discord, 
leaving the set of preferences empty).   
 
 
6 Some possible extensions of the proposed approach 
 
In previous sections preferences provided by decision makers were supposed to be precise 
and complete. But sometimes decision makers are not able to express their preferences in that 
manner due to lack of time, insufficient or incomplete information, limited knowledge, lack of 
appropriate education, prejudice, etc. In such a case, decision makers can provide uncertain 
preferences in many forms ranging from applications of fuzzy sets, computing with words, 
use of intervals, to belief and possibility theory.  
The proposed analysis of preferences can be extended to comprise some forms of 
uncertainty: 
• Fuzzy pairwise comparisons: One common way of expressing preferences are pairwise 
comparisons of objects. When uncertainty is involved in pairwise comparisons, an 
additive fuzzy preference relation is defined as a binary relation on a universal set X 
assigning each pair (x,y), Xyx ∈, , a value ρ from the interval [0,1] so that ρ(x,y) = 1 –  
ρ(y,x) (additive reciprocity). The value ρ(x,y) = 0.5 denotes indifference between 
objects, while the value 1 means that a given object is absolutely preferred over some 
other object, see (Orlovsky 1978; Perny and Roubens 1998; Herrera et al. 2001). Then, 
all pairwise comparisons can be written in a fuzzy pairwise comparison matrix, and 
their distance can be evaluated with the use of an appropriate matrix norm.  
• DMs can express his/her uncertain preferences with the use of triangular or trapezoidal 
fuzzy numbers with a suitable metric, see e.g. Voxman (1998). Moreover, fuzzy 
preferences can be incomplete too, see Herrera-Viedma et al. (2007).  
• Individual preferences can be expressed also in a form of words (the so called 
linguistic variables), see e. g. (Zadeh 1975; Xu 2013), where terms such as ‘good’ 
‘very good’, etc., are represented by fuzzy numbers.  
• DM can express his/her opinion in a crisp, but incomplete form. For example when 
ranking ten objects a DM can be able to rank only top three, leaving the rest of the list 
empty. Though there are methods for the evaluation of incomplete pairwise 
comparisons or incomplete rankings described in literature, the approach proposed in 
this paper relies on a precise measurement of a distance by a suitable metric function, 
which cannot be achieved for incomplete preferences in general.  
• The proposed approach can be extended to multiple criteria framework as well, with 
the evaluation of a distance among preferences taking place before an aggregation 
phase (for each criterion separately), or after the aggregation (for all criteria).  
 
Conclusions 
 
The aim of this paper was to introduce several measures for an analysis of decision 
makers’ preferences in a group decision making environment, which is a rather neglected 
issue in the literature. By the proposed measures a disagreement of each preference (each 
decision maker) can be assessed, so decision makers with the highest disagreement within a 
group can be identified, and asked to revise their opinion. Also, analysis of preferences can 
reveal ill-defined problems before a (futile) search for a consensus begins. Furthermore, the 
distance theorem (Proposition 1) bounding the maximum distance between a pivot and a 
consensus was introduced. The theorem facilitates search for a consensus especially for 
discrete spaces (for example for permutation spaces), as it reduces the searching space 
significantly. A simple procedure for dealing with ill-defined problems was proposed as well, 
though, of course, some unsolvable cases will persist. 
The proposed approach can be easily extended to cases with preferences not only in the 
form of ordinal rankings or real numbers, but also to cases with fuzzy preferences, fuzzy 
numbers or linguistic variables. Also, it can be extended to a multiple criteria environment. In 
such a case preferences can be analyzed for each criterion separately, or for all criteria at once 
after an aggregation step takes place.   
The future research might focus on the problem of the existence of a unique consensus. 
Vardi and Zhang (2000) showed that a unique consensus (unique geometric median) is 
achievable if all data points (in En) are not collinear (no three points lie on the same line), but 
no general result is known at present. Furthermore, as shown in Fiedor and Mazurek (2011), 
with growing differences among preferences (with growing entropy) a unique consensus is 
less likely to be achieved. The ultimate goal towards this direction might be to find general 
conditions (concerning a structure of preferences) under which a unique consensus exists or 
cannot be achieved, respectively. 
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